Ibn Taymiyya Against the Greek Logicians has 51 ratings and 0 reviews. Ibn Taymiyya, one of the greatest and most prolific thinkers of. Ibn Taymiyya Against the Greek Logicians by Ibn Taymiyyah, , available at Book Depository with free delivery worldwide. Ibn Taymiyya, Against the Greek Logicians Introduction and translation by Wael B . Hallaq Oxford: Clarendon Press, Iviii + p. Show all authors.

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Umer Yousuf rated it liked it Sep 12, The logicians agree that such a definition is linguistic, although it is the very thing needed in teaching works of scholarship, and indeed in studying all books as well as in all sorts of discourse.

The hearer [of this definition] can also form a greekk without being told anything at all. This involves us in the very process of definition which Ibn Taymiyya does not think to be fruitful.

All Arabic logicians writing in the Greek tradition have taken these rules for granted, 9 1 and the centrality of these rules meant that successfully taymiyua them would certainly be sufficient to prove the invalidity or, at least, the uselessness of the syllogistic theory.

What is essential in Arabic is not necessarily so in English.

He therefore set out to Ibn Taymiyya, one of the greatest and most prolific thinkers of medieval Islam, held Greek logic responsible for the “heretical” metaphysical conclusions reached by Islamic philosophers, theologians, mystics, and others.

For the aim is to reveal what the speaker intended by these names and this discourse. He had to vindicate his claim, and he did so by writing two treatises of his own in refutation of logic, namely, al-Qawl al-Mushriq and Sawn taymoyya.

So also can the mind conceive a human without conceiving that he or she is rational. The borrowings from Suhrawardi, Baghdad! Since definitions must deal with the former category of knowledge, the acceptance of a definition cannot be taken from the definer as a matter of faith, and thus the validity of the definition must presuppose a genuine apprehension of the definiendum.

When I was in Alexandria, I met one of those who glorify the philosophers 2 by exaggerating their importance and by imitating them, so I mentioned to him some of what they deserve by way of exposing their ignorance and errors. On this matter, we go along greekk Rescher’s views expressed in his article lgoicians Impact of Arabic Philosophy’, See Lear, Aristotle and Logical Theory, 8 – 9.


Whoever holds that the essence precedes the necessary concomitant attributes is blindly following 2 them on this issue. Eighth, if the definition is the statement of the definer, then it is known that in order to form concepts of meanings words are not needed, because the one who forms a concept does so without words.

Ibn Taymiyya understands analogy in a more developed sense than do Aristotle al-Radd, ; Jahd, Translation, par.

Ibn Taymiyya Against the Greek Logicians

Related to this matter is the interpretation and explanation of speech. A Clarendon Press Publication. The available evidence points to the contributions of Suhrawardi, Baghdad! It is precisely these two distinctions, together with the more general but fundamental distinction between essence and accident, that formed the chief target of Ibn Taymiyya’s criticism of the larger issue of real, complete definition.

But apprehension of the words presupposes an apprehension of the meanings or things to which they refer. Since acquired judgements may presuppose a knowledge of acquired concepts, the latter must be formed by means of gree, namely, a statement qawl which informs the mind of the quiddity of a thing. Our simple minds, he persistently held, cannot establish certainty and truth in the natural world.

For they mixed what the ahainst maintained about definitions with the prophetic sciences which the messengers of the Muslims, Jews, and Christians had introduced. When we hear a new word the meaning of which we do not know, we become aware of something, that is, the word itself, a fact which prompts us to enquire about its meaning as well as about the thing to which it refers.

Universality in so agaiinst as it is universality, being a logical construct, was generally considered to exist only in the mind without having any ontological status externally. The introduction of Greek philosophy into the Muslim world left an indelible mark on Islamic intellectual history. His methodology and epistemology—which partly derived from the then prevalent theological and legal doctrines, but See Sections 3 and 4 of Part I, above.


By ‘definition’ they mean the statement indicating the quiddity of the definiendum, 1 for it details what the name indicates in general. He demands no other premiss for the inference because all the knowledge needed subsists in that universal premiss.

But, most important, the essence is not subject to causal explication: But it has become clear to me that much in their views on logic is the source of logiicans errors in metaphysics, such as their theory of quiddities being composed of attributes they call essential; their discourse about confining the means of acquiring knowledge to the definitions, syllogisms, and demonstrations they have expounded; their theory of definition by means of which concepts are formed; and their theory of the forms of the syllogism and their apodictic subject-matter.

Thus, the very nominatum, or its equivalent, is pointed out accordingly. See Ibn Rajab, Dhayl, i. Qadi remembered with pride that it was he who had first permitted an intelligent and learned man like Ibn Taimiyah to give Fatwa.

Hermann Landolt has unsparingly afforded me his expertise on matters related to mysticism and metaphysics, and made useful comments on the Introduction.

McCarthy ; Sezgin, Geschichte, i. Against the most central logjcians upon which this discipline is founded, Ibn Taymiyya marshalled a legion of arguments that were intended to enhance and corroborate each other.

Ibn Taymiyya against the Greek Logicians by Ibn Taymiyyah – PDF Drive

Ibn Taymiyya’s critique then represents not so much the culmination of a tradition of anti-logical discourse as an ingenious and creative selection of already existing but disparate arguments. A necessary, inseparable attribute must thus presuppose a quiddity; and it is in this sense that such an attribute is not constitutive. Skip to main content. They are consistently introduced as subsidiary arguments, and never as self-sufficient.

Fourth, the logicians define the definiendum by means of attributes they call essential and accidental.